A Non-Consensus Based Decentralized Financial Transaction Processing Model with Support for Efficient Auditing by Gupta, Saurabh (Author) et al.
A Non-Consensus Based Decentralized Financial Transaction Processing Model
with Support for Efficient Auditing
by
Saurabh Gupta
A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science
Approved June 2016 by the
Graduate Supervisory Committee:
Rida Bazzi, Chair
Gail-Joon Ahn
Maurice Herlihy
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
August 2016
ABSTRACT
The success of Bitcoin has generated significant interest in the financial community to
understand whether the technological underpinnings of the cryptocurrency paradigm
can be leveraged to improve the efficiency of financial processes in the existing infras-
tructure. Various alternative proposals, most notably, Ripple and Ethereum, aim to
provide solutions to the financial community in different ways. These proposals derive
their security guarantees from either the computational hardness of proof-of-work or
voting based distributed consensus mechanism, both of which can be computationally
expensive. Furthermore, the financial audit requirements for a participating financial
institutions have not been suitably addressed.
This thesis presents a novel approach of constructing a non-consensus based decen-
tralized financial transaction processing model with a built-in efficient audit struc-
ture. The problem of decentralized inter-bank payment processing is used for the
model design. The two key insights used in this work are (1) to utilize a majority
signature based replicated storage protocol for transaction authorization, and (2) to
construct individual self-verifiable audit trails for each node as opposed to a common
Blockchain. Theoretical analysis shows that the model provides cryptographic secu-
rity for transaction processing and the presented audit structure facilitates financial
auditing of individual nodes in time independent of the number of transactions.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Motivation
Bitcoin [21], as a cryptographic proof-of-work based decentralized value exchange
mechanism, has demonstrated that it is practically possible for a distributed set of
networked nodes, which don’t trust each other, to arrive at a consensus about the
validity of individual transactions and maintain the collective transaction history of
the network, using a distributed ledger, without the need of centralized control. The
success of Bitcoin and the Blockchain structure have generated significant interest in
the financial community to understand whether the technological underpinnings of
the cryptocurrency paradigm can be leveraged to improve the efficiency of financial
processes in the existing infrastructure.
Decentralized inter-bank payment processing, smart contracts and distributed as-
set management have emerged as some interesting problems from this discussion.
Various alternative proposals, most notably, Ripple [24] and Ethereum [28], aim to
provide solutions to these problems in different ways. These proposals derive their
security guarantees from either the computational hardness of proof-of-work or vot-
ing based distributed consensus mechanism, both of which can be computationally
expensive. Furthermore, the financial audit requirements for a participating finan-
cial institution have not been suitably addressed. In this thesis, we present a novel
approach of constructing a non-consensus based decentralized financial transaction
processing model with a built-in efficient audit structure. We use the problem of
decentralized inter-bank payment processing for the model design.
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1.2 Inter-bank Payment Processing
Given banks B1 and B2 with respective customers c1 and c2, an inter-bank pay-
ment transaction T can be defined as an electronic transfer of amount x from customer
c1 at bank B1 to customer c2 at bank B2 such that the completed atomic transaction
consists of the following components.
1. Reduction of Liability for bank B1 towards customer c1 by amount x.
2. Increment of Liability for bank B2 towards customer c2 by amount x.
3. Electronic transfer of amount x from bank B1 to bank B2 as settlement towards
the transfer of Liability.
Note that the changes in liability for a bank towards its customer are managed
by the corresponding bank subject to its internal processes. Our discussion will focus
on the third component of the transaction processing.
1.2.1 Centralized Payment Processing
FFIEC IT Booklets [13] describe various payment processing mechanisms used by
the banking industry in US and mention that financial institutions are increasingly
relying on third-party service providers to perform payment processing functions on
their behalf. For instance, the most common methods for wholesale inter-bank pay-
ment processing are FedWire, operated by the Federal Reserve Banks, and CHIPS,
operated by The Clearing House Payments Company, wherein participating banks
rely on the corresponding service provider for payment processing. A simplified cen-
tralized payment processing model is depicted by the figure 1.1.
In the centralized payment processing model, Bank-1 and Bank-2 rely on the
Financial Institution, at the center of the figure, to perform the payment processing
2
Figure 1.1: Centralized Payment Processing Model
on their behalf when, for instance, Client-1 submits a transaction request at Bank-1
for the transfer of amount X to Client-2 at Bank-2.
1.2.2 Decentralized Payment Processing
Our model aims to replace the centralized control of the Financial Institution in
figure 1.1 by a distributed network of banks, as depicted by figure 1.2, that perform
the payment processing in a decentralized manner, while complying with regulatory
requirements. The figure shows an example of the distributed network containing 4
banks, however, we generalize the problem to include n banks.
The key elements of the decentralized inter-bank payment processing problem are
as follows. Given a distributed network consisting of process nodes S = {si : 1 ≤
i ≤ n}, where si is a server node federated by bank Bi, any inter-bank payment
transaction T should
• be completed securely and atomically, to reflect the transfer of amount x from
bank B1 to bank B2, in presence of Byzantine failures,
• have self-verifiable properties with non-repudiation, upon completion, for veri-
3
Figure 1.2: Decentralized Payment Processing Model
fication in case of future transaction processing and auditing, and
• be included in an immutable and self-verifiable audit structure for efficient fi-
nancial auditing subject to regulatory requirements.
1.3 Financial Auditing
Financial Auditing is an important aspect of the financial infrastructure. As per
US Government regulations [12, 25], public companies, including commercial banks,
are required to publish periodic financial statements along with an auditor’s attesta-
tion and the audit is required to be performed by an independent public accountant
in case of large companies.
PCAOB Auditing Standards [22] define the objective of audit of financial state-
ments as ”the expression of an opinion on the fairness with which they present, in
all material respects, financial position, results of operations, and its cash flows in
4
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.” Audit procedures include
assessment of internal controls over reporting as well as substantive procedures for
gathering evidence. Thus, it is important for a financial system to have efficient sup-
port for substantive procedures with strong internal controls in order to be efficiently
audited.
We propose an audit structure that establishes periodic partial ordering of trans-
actions into summarized checkpoints with respect to each participant and create in-
dividual audit trails for efficient auditing. Our results show that our audit structure
facilitates financial auditing of individual nodes in time independent of the number
of transactions.
1.4 Organization of the Thesis
The organization of the thesis is as follows:
• Chapter 2 discusses the related work in the field of cryptocurrency and dis-
tributed systems.
• Chapter 3 introduces the system model for the decentralized inter-bank payment
processing problem.
• Chapter 4 presents the transaction model and authorization protocol, along
with the detailed analysis of the protocol.
• Chapter 5 presents the audit structure used for efficient financial auditing, along
with detailed theoretical analysis.
• Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and discusses future work on the problem.
5
Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
2.1 Distributed Consensus
Pease, Shostak and Lamport [23, 16] introduced the term Byzantine Fault Tol-
erance using the Byzantine Generals Problem, as a distributed consensus problem,
where a set of f faulty process nodes may arbitrarily deviate from the defined pro-
cess by tampering with or suppressing messages. Their results showed the solution
requires at least 3f + 1 process nodes.
Fischer et al. [14] showed that it is impossible to achieve distributed consensus in
presence of even one faulty node using totally asynchronous model of computation.
Practical solutions, like Bitcoin [21], adopt a model that allows partial synchrony in
order to aim for probabilistic consensus over a period of time.
Our analysis shows that a non-consensus based transaction processing model can
provide Byzantine fault tolerance in an asynchronous distributed network.
2.2 Cryptocurrency Systems
Back [6] first introduced, through Hashcash, the notion of cryptographic proof
of computational work as a mechanism for secure value transfer over the Internet.
This idea was later expanded and developed by Nakamoto [21] into Bitcoin as a
cryptocurrency implementation wherein the network can securely achieve distributed
consensus over the validity of financial transactions and collectively build a distributed
immutable ledger, namely the Blockchain. Bitcoin has been extensively studied and
analyzed most notably by Garay et al. [15], Clark et al. [11], Bonneau et al. [9],
6
Tschorsch and Scheuermann [27].
Factom, introduced by Snow et al. [26], aims at providing a mechanism for busi-
nesses to access the Bitcoin blockchain to record their transactions for generating an
immutable audit trail. Wood [28] discusses Ethereum as a generalized platform with
a Turing-complete scripting language upon which various decentralized transaction
systems can be built.
As a computationally inexpensive alternative to proof-of-work mechanism, Bentov
et al. [8] discuss pure proof-of-stake based protocols and their potential gains in terms
of efficiency, while hypothesizing that the cryptographic security can possibly be worse
relative to Bitcoin subject to short-term human behavior.
Alternatively, Ripple, introduced by Schwartz et al. [24], has shown that an
efficient currency exchange and financial clearing system can be built upon a federated
system using voting based-consensus mechanism. Mazieres [20] introduced Federated
Byzantine Agreement, and Stellar Consensus Protocol as its construction, which uses
two-phases voting mechanism to achieve consensus in a network that allows open
membership and dynamic growth.
All the current proposals aim to solve the problem of achieving distributed con-
sensus in order to provide cryptographic security for the transaction processing. Our
work introduces the novel approach of using a non-consensus based transaction pro-
cessing model.
2.3 Replicated Storage
Aiyer et al. [4] presented a bounded wait-free distributed register that does not
require communication channels among processing nodes in order to improve message
complexity of the protocol.
Aiyer et al. [5] introduced a MAC based signature scheme for distributed system
7
by constructing a matrix of MAC tags {hi,j : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n}, such that each tag hi,j is
said to be signed by node i and can be verified by node j.
Our model derives ideas from both these papers. We use a model of commu-
nication where a sender node communicates with the processing nodes that do not
interact with each other during the processing of the transaction. Also, our protocol
constructs a set of digital signatures for a transaction similar to the matrix of MAC
tags.
2.4 Distributed Checkpointing
For our audit structure design, we use distributed audit checkpoints. Distributed
checkpointing was introduced by Chandy and Lamport [10] as a useful tool for com-
puting the global state of a distributed computation. In their model, all the nodes
coordinate in recording the local states of all nodes and channels into a distributed
snapshot representing the global state.
However, we introduce a different approach wherein each node constructs its check-
points comprising only of the transactions involving itself and proceeds to request
authorization from the network to construct its own audit trail for financial auditing
purposes.
2.5 Payment Systems
FFIEC IT Booklets [13] describe various payment processing mechanisms used by
the banking industry in US as discussed in section 1.2.1. Commonly used electronic
payment processing methods include The Automated Clearing House (ACH) 1 for
1 ACH networks operate in accordance with guidelines by NACHA — The Electronic Payments
Association. https://www.nacha.org/ach-network
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retail payments, and FedWire 2 and CHIPS 3 for wholesale payments. These payment
methods are centralized and rely on a service provider to process and settle payments
on behalf of the participating commercial banks and financial institutions. Our model
introduces a decentralized approach to payment processing and settlement where
participating banks can process payments without the aid of any third party service
provider.
2 FedWire is operated by the Federal Reserve Banks. https://www.frbservices.org
3 CHIPS is operated by The Clearing House (formerly known as the New York Clearing House
Association). https://www.theclearinghouse.org
9
Chapter 3
SYSTEM MODEL
In this chapter, we firstly discuss the initial pre-conditions required to be satisfied
in order for the proposed system model to be implemented. Then, we present the
network model along with its assumptions. Finally, we discuss an overview of the
customer transaction in view of the network model.
3.1 Pre-conditions
We assume that the bootstrapping of the proposed system will begin with an offline
legal binding contract among a set of commercial banks B = {Bi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, such
that each bank Bi will allocate a server node si and a minimum pre-funding amount xi
for the server node si in order to participate in the decentralized inter-bank payment
processing, in presence of a set of legally authorized auditors A = {ai : i ≥ 1}
external to the banks in set B. Each bank Bi will be expected to maintain explicit
private ledger entries specifying the allocation of amount xi from its liquid accounts
for the purpose of transparent reconciliation and auditing between its private ledger
and the system’s distributed ledger.
For the current state of this work, the execution of contracts is out of scope
of the system and will be expected to be performed in traditional offline fashion.
However, any changes proposed to the server node membership or pre-funding amount
corresponding to a bank Bi ∈ B will be required to be cryptographically signed by an
auditor upon verification of Bi’s private and distributed ledger histories for meeting
contract compliance requirements.
10
3.2 Network Model and Assumptions
We define the network as composed of 3 categories of nodes:
• Server Nodes consisting of the set S = {si : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, where each server node
si is federated by the corresponding bank Bi, while the set S is decentralized
subject to offline contractual accountability requirements.
• Interface Nodes: We define an interface node ei, federated by bank Bi, as an
application server node acting as a transaction request interface for the bank’s
customers. The set of interface nodes is defined as E = {ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. The
purpose of separation between interface nodes and server nodes is to provide
a layer of abstraction between a bank’s private ledger functionality and the
distributed ledger functionality to be separately managed by interface nodes
and server nodes respectively.
• Auditor Nodes comprising of logical or physical nodes corresponding to the
set of auditors A = {ai : i ≥ 1} in accordance with the offline contract.
Figure 3.1 demonstrates an example of our network model consisting of four Banks
and one Auditor Node. The solid boundary corresponds to the distributed network
consisting of the server nodes, and the dashed boundaries correspond to individual
banks, each containing the interface node and server node for corresponding bank.
Note that an interface nodes interact with only the server node within its bank’s
boundary.
We assume that the auditor nodes and interface nodes are benign, while the up
to f server nodes can be subject to Byzantine failures, such that n = 3f + 1.
We assume that each server node has a key pair 〈sk , pk〉, where sk is the se-
cret signing key and pk is the public signature verification key, and the signature
11
Figure 3.1: Network Model Example
verification key pk is known to every server and auditor node in the network. Addi-
tionally, we assume that there exists a Digital Signature scheme 〈Sign, Verify〉, where
Sign : d← Signsk(m) is the function used to producing the digital signature d for the
message m, and Verify : b ← Verifypk(m, d), such that b ∈ {true, false}, is the func-
tion that verifies the digital signature d for the message m and Verifypk(m, d) = true
if and only if the signature d is valid for the message m. Additionally, we assume
that signatures can not be forged.
We assume that interface nodes will validate and process customer transaction
requests in accordance with the process specifications of the corresponding bank, and
we do not wish to propose any changes to the internal transaction processing functions
of any bank.
12
3.3 Transaction Overview
Let us consider a transaction submitted by customer c1 using interface node e1
at bank B1 for payment of amount x to customer c2 at bank B2. The transaction
processing will involve the following steps.
1. Interface node e1 reduces the customer c1’s balance by amount x in bank B1’s
private ledger
2. Bank B1’s server node s1 performs a payment processing transaction to transfer
amount x to bank B2’s server node s2 using the distributed network of server
nodes S
3. Bank B1 communicates the customer information for the transaction to Bank
B2 for reconciliation with the payment processing transaction in step 2 and
transfer of amount x to customer c2
4. Interface node e2 increments customer c2’s balance by amount x in bank B2’s
private ledger
Steps 1 and 4 involve changes in the private ledgers of the corresponding banks,
and we assume that these changes will be managed by the corresponding banks subject
to their internal processes.
Although steps 2 and 3 can intuitively be combined, we have mentioned them
separately to make an interesting distinction. Note that the transaction in step 2
involves server s1 and s2, and can be agnostic of the customers involved in the overall
transaction. Whereas, the communication in step 3 requires customer information to
be transmitted. If the customer information is included in the payment processing
transaction in step 2, it will be visible to all the server nodes in the network, which
includes potentially Byzantine server nodes.
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We do not wish to make the assumption whether this will be desirable to the
banks involved. So, let us consider the various cases in terms of possible requirements
according to the banks.
• Case 1: Customer information can be transmitted as plain-text in the payment
processing transaction according to the requirements. In this case, steps 2-3 can
be combined and customer information can be included as plain-text metadata
to the payment processing transaction in step 2. The metatdata information
can be used by bank B2 for reconciliation and transfer of funds to the customer.
• Case 2: Encrypted customer information can be transmitted in the payment
processing transaction according to the requirements. We assume that the en-
cryption scheme will be decided as a part of the requirements and corresponding
keys will be suitably shared among the banks. Now, steps 2-3 can be combined
and the bank B1 can provide its server node s1 with the encrypted customer
information, such that it can be decrypted by bank B2 only, to be included
as metadata to the payment processing transaction in step 2. The decrypted
metatdata information can be used by bank B2 for reconciliation and transfer
of funds to the customer.
• Case 3: Customer information can not be transmitted in the payment processing
transaction according to the requirements. In this case, the steps 2 and 3 will be
required to be processed separately. After the payment processing transaction
in step 2 is completed, bank B1 can communicate the information to the bank
B2 using a separate private channel for reconciliation and step 4 processing.
Therefore, irrespective of the case adopted by the banks involved in the imple-
mentation of the system model, we assume that step 3 will be performed as a part of
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the transaction processing. We will focus on the payment processing transaction in
step 2 for our transaction model in chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
TRANSACTION PROCESSING MODEL
In a traditional transaction model, each entity is associated with a balance value,
which is a cumulative total of all the incoming and outgoing transactions for the entity,
and the validity of a transaction is contingent upon availability of funds represented
by the balance value.
In contrast, Bitcoin [21] represents a transaction as a mapping between input
transactions and redeemable outputs. A transaction output is said to be an can-
didate for being used as an input for a new transaction if it has not been used as
an input for any transaction, and such a transaction output is termed as an un-
spent transaction. As a result, the input-output mapping transaction model provides
a proof of availability of funds that can be verified without the knowledge of the
balance value associated with the transaction initiator if the distributed transaction
processing model prevents a spent transaction output to be used as an input in a new
transaction, referred to as a double-spend transaction. Bitcoin attempts to enforce
this constraint by requiring eventual network consensus over complete transaction set
using the Blockchain, where a block containing a double-spend transaction is rejected
by all the non-faulty processing nodes and not included in the longest branch of the
Blockchain.
We adopt a transaction model similar to the Bitcoin transaction model where a
transaction is represented as an input-output mapping. However, our transaction
processing model differs from Bitcoin such that each server node si is required to
maintain only the set of transactions that are processed by the node si, instead of
requiring it to maintain all the transactions. Also, each server node si validates a
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transaction independent of the validations performed by other server nodes in the
network and provides a signature for the transaction if si considers it valid according
to the information available to it. A transaction is said to be authorized when it
receives valid signatures from 2f + 1 server nodes, and the resulting signature set
is considered a proof of validity for the transaction. Each server node si, that signs
a transaction, is required to maintain the transaction as a part of its transaction
set, which is used by the node si to validate future transactions. Our results show
that double-spend transaction can not be authorized in our model, without requiring
network consensus over either the complete transaction set or the validity of individual
transactions during processing.
Authorized transactions should become part of the permanent record of activity of
servers involved in the transaction as a sender or receiver. In order to support auditing
of transactions, each server should reconcile, in a permanent record and at regular
intervals, the sequence of transactions it is involved in. Before being committed to
this permanent record, a transaction is new, and after it is committed, the transaction
changes status and is no longer new. The discussion of the details of this commitment
process is given in Chapter 5.
The organization of this chapter is as follows.
• In section 4.1, we define the transaction data structures used in our model.
• Section 4.2 defines the validation structure to be used by a server node for
validating transactions.
• Section 4.3 discusses the transaction processing protocol for a transaction sender
node, receiver node and a processing node.
• In section 4.4, we analyze the transaction processing model.
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• Section 4.5 discusses some efficiency improvement ideas pertaining to the trans-
action processing model.
4.1 Transaction Data Structures
The life-cycle of a transaction involves 2 stages:
1. Proposed: When a sender node initiates the transaction for authorization, the
transaction is said to be a proposed transaction. We use T to denote a proposed
transaction. The structural composition of a proposed transaction is described
in definition 4.1.
2. Authorized: When a server node receives a proposed transaction T , it vali-
dates the transaction and responds with a signature if the proposed transaction
is valid according to it. Once the sender node receives 2f + 1 signatures from
the network, the transaction is said to be authorized by the network. We use T
to denote an authorized transaction. The authorized transaction data structure
is described in definitions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.
Definition 4.1. (Proposed Transaction) A proposed transaction T is defined as a
5-tuple 〈s, id, I, O, d〉, where
• s is the server node that initiates the transaction T .
• id is integer sequence number assigned to the transaction T .
• O is the set of redeemable outputs of the transaction T and is defined as
O = {〈j, sj, xj〉 : sj is the jth recipient server node, and xj is the amount to
be received by it }
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• I is the set of input transactions for T and is defined as
I = {〈T, j〉 : T is an authorized input transaction, and j is the output index to
be used from the transaction T }
• d is the digital signature of the sender node s for the transaction 〈s, id, I, O〉.
For simplifying the notations, we have included the authorized transactions T in
the definition of input transactions set I. However, for implementation purposes, it
can be replaced by a pair 〈s, id〉 where s is the sender node and id is the sequence
number of the corresponding transaction T.
Definition 4.2. (Authorized Transaction) An authorized transaction T, depicted by
the figure 4.1, is defined as a pair 〈T, D〉, where T = 〈s, id, I, O, d, 〉 is the under-
lying proposed transaction and D represents the set of 2f + 1 server node signatures
collected during the authorization of the transaction T .
Figure 4.1: Transaction Model
Definition 4.2.1. (Authorized Transaction) A transaction T : 〈T, D〉 is said to be
authorized if D contains 2f + 1 valid signatures from distinct server nodes.
authorized(〈T,D〉) , (∀(sj, dj) ∈ D, Verifypkj(T, dj) = true) ∧ |D| = 2f + 1
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Using the transaction model discussed above, each server si maintains the follow-
ing data structures for the local image of the distributed transaction history.
1. Authorized Transactions (TA) is a set of transactions T authorized according
to the server node si.
2. New Transactions (TN) is set of 3-tuples 〈T, s, θ〉, where θ is the status
of authorized transaction T with respect to the server node s involved in the
transaction as a sender or receiver. When a transaction T is authorized, the
status θ = new for the transaction T with respect to each server node sj involved
in it. When the transaction is committed to the permanent record by the
corresponding server node, the status θ changes and is no longer new. The
discussion of the details of this commitment process is given in Chapter 5.
Note that the each transaction T has one entry in the authorized transaction set
TA, whereas it can have multiple independent entries in the new transaction set TN
because each transaction T has at least 2 server nodes involved, i.e. a sender and a
receiver.
For simplifying the notations, we have included the authorized transactions T in
the definition of new transaction set TN . However, for implementation purposes, it
can be replaced by a pair 〈s′, id〉 where s′ is the sender node and id is the sequence
number of the corresponding transaction T. The 〈s′, id〉 pair can be used to retrieve
the corresponding authorized transaction from the authorized transaction set TA.
4.2 Transaction Validations
In order to ensure that a server’s transactions are processed in order, we require
that the server provide consecutive sequence numbers for its transaction. This re-
quirement is enforced by having the server include the last authorized transaction
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initiated by the server.
When a sender node si sends a proposed transaction T : 〈si, idc, I, O, di〉 to the
server nodes for authorization, it is accompanied by the last authorized transaction
Tp for the sender node si. Note that the definition of the input transaction set
I includes the authorized input transactions that can be used for validations by a
processing server node even if the corresponding transactions are not present in its
local authorized transaction set TA. For implementation purposes, the authorized
input transactions can be required to accompany the transaction processing request,
which serves the equivalent objective.
The transaction T is considered valid by a non-faulty server node if all the following
conditions hold.
1. The transaction request parameters 〈T,Tp〉 are structurally well-formed, i.e.
(a) The transaction Tp is an authorized transaction with si as the sender node
and sequence number used in Tp is one less than the sequence number idc
used in T
(b) All the input transactions, in I, are authorized transactions received by
the node si
(c) The sum of amounts in the input set I is equal to the sum of amounts in
the output set O
(d) The signature di is the valid signature for the sender for si over the trans-
action 〈si, idc, I, O〉
2. The transaction T is functionally valid, i.e.
(a) All the input transactions, in I, are unspent transactions as per the au-
thorized transaction set TA of the processing node
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(b) The sequence number idc used in T is greater than all the sequence num-
bers used by the node si in previous transactions as per the authorized
transaction set TA of the processing node
Note that the structural validations depend upon the request parameters 〈T,Tp〉
only, while the functional validations depend upon the authorized transaction set
TA. Therefore, if a transaction is structurally valid according to one non-faulty node,
it will be structurally valid according to all non-faulty nodes. However, the func-
tional validity of a transaction may vary among non-faulty nodes depending upon the
transactions in their authorized transaction set TA.
Also, the previous transaction Tp is unique with respect to each proposed trans-
action T because according to validation 1(a), it is required to be an authorized
transaction with exactly the previous sequence number, and according to validation
2(b), the sequence number in T is required to be new, which will not be valid if Tp is
used multiple times.
We now formally define the individual validations as building blocks for the struc-
tural and functional validations as mentioned above.
Definition 4.3. (Amounts Validation) A transaction T : 〈s, id, I, O, d〉 is said to
be valid in terms of the transaction amounts if the sum of input amounts and the sum
of output amounts are equal.
validAmounts(I, O) ,
∑
xj∈O
xj =
∑
(T,j)∈I
T.O[j].x
Definition 4.4. (Previous Transaction Validation) A transaction Tp : 〈Tp, Dp〉 is
said to be the valid previous transaction corresponding to the proposed transaction T
if Tp is an authorized transaction and and T.id = Tp.id+1 and both transactions were
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initiated by the same node.
validPrevTxn(T,Tp) , authorized(Tp) ∧ (T.s = Tp.s) ∧ (T.id = Tp.id+ 1)
Definition 4.5. (Own Inputs Validation) A node s is said to have included only its
own authorized input transactions in the proposed transaction T : 〈s, id, I, O, d〉 if
all the authorized transaction inputs in I correspond to the node s.
ownInputs(s, I) , ∀(T, j) ∈ I, authorized(T) ∧ (T.O[j].sj = s)
Definition 4.6. (Unspent Input Validation) A set of inputs I in a proposed transac-
tion Tc, initiated by the node s, is said to be unspent if none of the input transactions
has been used as an input for another transaction by the node s.
unspent(s, I) , ∀(T, j) ∈ I, (T, j) /∈ {TA[s].I}
Definition 4.7. (Sequence Number Validation) A sequence number idc in a proposed
transaction T , initiated by the node s, is said to be valid if it is greater than the
maximum sequence number used by the node s in previously authorized transactions.
validId(s, idc) , idc > max{id : id ∈ TA[s]}
4.2.1 Structural Validations
When a server node s receives a transaction for authorization from the sender node
sj, the node s first validates the structural integrity of the transaction, i.e. ascertains
whether it is well-formed. If the transaction is structurally invalid, the node s rejects
the transaction. The corresponding validation is defined as follows.
Definition 4.8. (Well-formed Transaction) A transaction T proposed by a node sj,
along with previous transaction evidence Tp, is said to be well-formed if sender’s
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signature is valid, all the inputs in T are sj’s own authorized transactions, and the
transaction amounts and the previous transaction are valid.
wellFormed(T,Tp) , (Verifypkj(T, Tc.d) = true) ∧ ownInputs(T.s, T.I)
∧ validPrevTxn(T,Tp) ∧ validAmounts(T.I, T.O)
4.2.2 Functional Validations
After validating the structural integrity of the transaction processing request us-
ing definition 4.8, the server node s performs functional validations to verify that
the transaction is not a double-spend transaction using definition 4.6. In doing the
validation, the server node s uses its local knowledge of the authorized transaction
set TA. So it is possible that a non-faulty server node will consider a double-spend
transaction valid because it may not be aware of the conflicting transaction. Never-
theless, if a transaction is a double-spend transaction, it will not be considered valid
by enough servers required for authorizing it.
Similarly, the server node s also verifies, using its local knowledge, that the se-
quence number has not been used previously using definition 4.7.
Definition 4.9. (Functionally Valid Transaction) A transaction T proposed by a node
s is said to be functionally valid if all the inputs are unspent and the sequence number
is valid.
validTxn(T ) , unspent(T.s, T.I) ∧ validId(T.s, T.id)
4.3 Transaction Protocol
We now present the transaction authorization protocol used by the server nodes
to propose, authorize and accept transactions.
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4.3.1 Sender Protocol
Without loss of generality, let us consider a transaction submitted by customer
c1 using interface node e1 at bank B1 for payment of amount x to customer c2 at
bank B2. The interface node e1 will send the transaction to the server node s1 for
processing. The server node s1 will construct the transaction in the form of a pair
(I, O) as the input and output transaction sets respectively, where one of the outputs
in O will correspond to a server node s2 for amount x, and initiate the protocol
depicted in figure 4.2 for transaction authorization.
Figure 4.2: Transaction Sender Protocol
The sender node si maintains a current identifier counter value (idc) to assign the
id value to its transactions. The function Process-Txn takes the transaction in the
form of (I, O) as input and returns the authorized transaction (T,D) as output. It
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begins by constructing the transaction (lines 5-6) and processes the transaction in 2
phases:
• Phase 1 (Authorization): Sender node si sends the authorization request to
all servers (line 8). The transaction authorization request is accompanied by
the previous authorized transaction (with identifier idc− 1) as a proof that the
node si is using sequential identifier values. Sender node waits for 2f + 1 valid
node signatures (lines 10-16). Once the transaction is authorized, si proceeds
to phase 2.
• Phase 2 (Commit): Sender node si sends the transaction commit request
along with the set D containing 2f + 1 signatures to all server nodes (line
18) and waits for acknowledgements from 2f + 1 server nodes (line 19). Once
the acknowledgements are received, si commits the transaction (line 20) using
the commit-txn procedure depicted in figure 4.5 and returns it (line 21) for
internal processing, if any.
Note that the transaction is authorized at the end of phase 1 from the sender
node’s perspective, but only the sender node has the proof of authorization, i.e. the
signature set D, at the end of phase 1. Phase 2 is used to communicate the signature
set D to the network so that it can be read by the receiver node without depending
on the sender node.
4.3.2 Receiver Protocol
In an ideal scenario, we would expect the sender node to communicate the com-
mitted transaction to the receiver node. However, since the sender node could be
faulty, we do not assume that such a communication will take place in a timely man-
ner. Therefore, we define a protocol, depicted in figure 4.3, for the receiver node, say
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sk, to read and process incoming transactions from the network.
Figure 4.3: Transaction Receiver Protocol
The receiver node sk sends the read request for new transactions to all server nodes
(line 3) and processes responses from 2f + 1 nodes (lines 5-10). Node sk compiles
a transaction set TR, which is the union of all the transaction sets T∗ returned by
the server nodes (line 6), and a set R to keep track of the server nodes that respond
in order to satisfy the termination condition of 2f + 1 responses (line 10). Once it
receives 2f + 1 responses, node sk commits, using the commit-txn procedure, all
authorized transactions that are not already committed (lines 11-13).
Firstly, we know that at most f nodes can be faulty, and as a result sk is guaranteed
to receive 2f + 1 responses which guarantees termination. Now, let a set TR denote
the set of transaction authorized at the time when the node sk initiates the protocol
such that each transaction in TR is initiated by a non-faulty node and has sk as an
output receiver. We know that each such transaction is written back to 2f + 1 server
nodes in the network by its sender node, i.e. at least f + 1 non-faulty nodes have
the authorized transaction with the signature set. Therefore, sk is guaranteed to
receive each transaction from at least one server node during the processing of 2f + 1
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responses. So, sk is guaranteed to have received all the transactions in T
R at the end
of the receiver protocol.
4.3.3 Server Node Protocol
We now discuss the protocol used by server nodes, depicted in figure 4.4, to process
transaction requests from sender and receiver nodes. Consider a server node sj that
receives the processing request.
Figure 4.4: Server Node Protocol for Transaction Processing
The transaction authorization protocol is represented in lines 1-23.
• Phase 1 (Authorization): When the node sj receives the transaction autho-
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rization request for transaction T with previous transaction Tp from the node si
(line 2), sj processes it only if the transaction request is well-formed as per the
definition 4.8 (line 3). If either the previous transaction Tp or any of the input
transactions is not a committed transaction, sj commits those transactions for
further processing (lines 5-8). Now, if the transaction is functionally valid (line
10), sj saves the transaction (line 12) and sends the signed transaction to the
sender node (line 13).
• Phase 2 (Commit): When the node sj receives the transaction commit re-
quest for transaction T with signature set D from the node si (line 18), sj verifies
whether the transaction is authorized (line 19). If the validation succeeds, sj
commits the transaction and responds to the sender node.
The new transaction request protocol for the server nodes is represented in lines
25-28. The node sj responds to requests from server nodes sk (line 25) by constructing
the set TR of new transactions that involve the node sk as a receiver (line 26) and
sending the set to the node sk in response (line 27).
The transaction commit procedure commit-txn is depicted in figure 4.5. When
a transaction is committed, it is stored in two transaction sets: authorized trans-
actions (line 6) and new transactions (line 7). The new transaction set stores one
copy of the transaction for each node involved in the transaction as input or out-
put. The procedure also ensures that commit is not performed for already committed
transactions.
Server nodes commit missing transactions (fig 4.4, lines 5-8) for two reasons.
Firstly, it helps them improve their local knowledge of the authorized transactions
in the network. Secondly, if a faulty sender node terminates sender protocol at the
end of phase 1, the transaction will not be committed by any server node in the
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Figure 4.5: Transaction Commit Procedure
network. As a result, it will not be available as a new transaction for any server node
and consequently, the receiver will not receive the transaction during the receiver
protocol. However, we know that the sender node will be required to send the this
authorized transaction while processing the next transaction, and each server node
can commit the transaction at this time and guarantee progress.
4.4 Analysis
For our analysis of the transaction processing protocol, we consider the following
properties:
• Theorem 4.1: If non-faulty sender node initiates a transaction, the sender pro-
tocol is guaranteed to terminate.
• Theorem 4.2: All transactions initiated by non-faulty sender nodes will be
accepted as authorized transactions by their corresponding non-faulty receiver
nodes.
• Theorem 4.3: A transaction is authorized if and only if it is structurally and
functionally valid.
Theorem 4.1. If non-faulty sender node initiates a transaction, the sender protocol
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is guaranteed to terminate.
Proof. If the sender node is non-faulty, then its transaction must be valid because
a non-faulty sender node validates the transaction before sending it to the network
and the sender node has complete knowledge of all the transactions sent by it in the
past, which prevents it from accidentally constructing a double-spend transactions.
Therefore, we can say that the transaction must be structurally and functionally valid
as per definitions 4.8 and 4.9 respectively.
So, as per algorithm 3 (fig 4.4), each non-faulty server node will sign the transac-
tion. We know that there are at most f faulty nodes, i.e. there are at least 2f + 1
non-faulty nodes in the network, so the sender is guaranteed to receive at least 2f +1
signatures, which may or may not contain signatures from faulty nodes, in phase 1.
Therefore, the sender will be able to complete phase 1 and proceed to phase 2.
We know that the sender node verifies each received signature during construction
of the signature set D (fig 4.2, lines 12-13), so the signature set D must be valid and
as a result, it will be accepted as an authorized transaction, as per definition 4.2.1,
by each non-faulty server node during phase 2. So, the sender will receive at least
2f + 1 acknowledgements during phase 2 and terminate the protocol.
Theorem 4.2. All transactions initiated by non-faulty sender nodes will be accepted
as authorized transactions by their corresponding non-faulty receiver nodes.
Proof. Using the argument from Theorem 4.1, we can say that if a non-faulty sender
node initiates a transaction T , the sender is guaranteed to complete phase 2 and
terminate. This means that the transaction T will be authorized at the end of phase
1, and the authorized transaction will be acknowledged by at least 2f + 1 nodes
during phase 2. As per algorithm 3 (fig 4.4), during phase 2, a non-faulty server
node commits the transaction T before acknowledging it (lines 20-21). Since at most
31
f nodes can be faulty, we can conclude that the transaction will be committed by at
least f + 1 non-faulty nodes at the end of phase 2. We consider the worst case that
when the sender node received 2f + 1 acknowledgements during phase 2, f of them
were sent by faulty nodes which did not commit the transaction, and exactly f + 1
non-faulty nodes committed the transaction T .
As per algorithm 2 (fig 4.3), when a non-faulty receiver node requests new trans-
actions from the network, it only processes the first arrived 2f + 1 responses before
termination. If a transaction T is committed by f + 1 non-faulty nodes and a non-
faulty receiver, say sr, of the transaction T executes the receiver protocol, the node sr
is guaranteed to receive a response from at least one of those f + 1 non-faulty nodes,
say si, as a part of the first arrived 2f + 1 responses. Since the si is non-faulty, it will
communicate the transaction T in its response. As the transaction T is authorized,
the receiver sr will accept the transaction as authorized as per definition 4.2.1.
For the proof of Theorem 4.3, we consider the following lemmas.
• Lemma 4.1: If a transaction is authorized, then it must be structurally valid.
• Lemma 4.2: A sender node si completes phase 1 for a transaction T , with se-
quence number idc, if and only if each of the preceding transactions initiated by
the node si, with sequence numbers id < idc, are authorized and are committed
by at least f + 1 non-faulty nodes.
• Lemma 4.3: If a transaction is authorized, then it must be functionally valid.
Lemma 4.1. If a transaction T is authorized, then it must be structurally valid.
Proof. We know that each non-faulty server node performs structural validations
using the request parameters only, and as a result, if a transaction is structurally
invalid according to definition 4.8, it will be invalid according to every non-faulty
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server node (fig 4.4, line 3). Therefore, a structurally invalid transaction will be
rejected by each non-faulty server node. Since there are at most f faulty nodes and
at least 2f+1 non-faulty nodes, the structurally invalid transaction can not be signed
by more than f node (all faulty). Hence, a structurally invalid transaction can not
be authorized as per definition 4.2.1.
Lemma 4.2. A sender node si completes phase 1 for a transaction T , with sequence
number idc, if and only if each of the preceding transactions initiated by the node si,
with sequence numbers id < idc, are authorized and are committed by at least f + 1
non-faulty nodes.
Proof. We know that the sender node si is required to include the previous authorized
transaction Tp, with sequence number idc − 1, as a transaction processing request
parameter in phase 1 of the processing of the transaction T , and it is validated during
the structural validations as per definitions 4.8 and 4.4. As per the hypothesis, the
sender node si is able to complete phase 1 for a transaction T , which means that it has
received 2f + 1 signatures and is considered authorized as per definition 4.2.1. From
lemma 4.1, we know that if the transaction T is authorized, it must be structurally
valid. Therefore, the transaction Tp must be authorized and its sequence number
must be idc − 1.
If the transaction Tp is authorized, the sender node si must have completed phase
1 of the sender protocol for it. Let us consider the two cases for the processing of the
transaction Tp.
• Case 1: If the sender node si is non-faulty, we know from the arguments in
theorems 4.1 and 4.2 that the sender node si must have completed phase 2 for
the the transaction Tp and it must be committed by at least f + 1 non-faulty
nodes.
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• Case 2: If the sender node si is faulty, it may not have completed or even
initiated phase 2 for the transaction Tp. For the worst case consideration, we
assume that the sender node si did not initiate phase 2 for the transaction Tp.
As a result, no non-faulty node can have committed the transaction Tp because
transaction commit is a part of phase 2 processing for the server nodes.
As discussed earlier, the sender node si sends the transaction Tp as a request
parameter in the succeeding transaction T and the transaction T is authorized.
This means that the transaction T has been signed by at least f + 1 non-
faulty nodes. We know from algorithm 3 (fig 4.4), that a non-faulty server node
commits the previous transaction Tp (line 5) before signing the transaction
T . This means that each of the (at least) f + 1 non-faulty nodes would have
committed the authorized transaction Tp before signing the transaction T , and
as a result, the transaction Tp must be committed by at least f + 1 non-faulty
nodes.
Therefore, we have established that if a transaction T , sent by server node si with
sequence number idc, is authorized, then the previous authorized transaction Tp, sent
by server node si with sequence number idc− 1, must be committed by at least f + 1
non-faulty nodes.
We can apply the same argument to say that the transaction T′p, sent by server
node si with sequence number idc−2, must be committed by at least f+1 non-faulty
nodes because its succeeding transaction Tp is authorized and the sender node si must
have completed phase 1 for it. Therefore, using induction, we can conclude that each
of the preceding transaction sent by sender node si, with sequence numbers id < idc
must be committed by at least f + 1 non-faulty nodes.
Lemma 4.3. If a transaction T is authorized, then it must be functionally valid.
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Proof. As per functional validation definition 4.9, a transaction T, initiated by the
sender node si, can be functionally invalid in two cases.
• Case 1: The sequence number idc, used in the transaction T, is invalid.
We know that the sender node si is required to include the previous authorized
transaction Tp, with sequence number idc−1, as a transaction processing request
parameter in phase 1 of the processing of the transaction T , and it is validated
during the structural validations as per definitions 4.8 and 4.4. As the trans-
action T is authorized, it must be structurally valid according to lemma 4.1,
and as a result, sequence number idc in the transaction T must be one greater
than the sequence number in the transaction Tp. So, the sequence number idc
can not be arbitrarily large. It can only be invalid if it is not greater than the
largest sequence number used node si in previous transactions.
As the transaction T is authorized, the sender must have completed phase 1 for
it, and using lemma 4.2, we can say that each of the preceding transaction sent
by sender node si, with sequence numbers id < idc must be committed by at
least f + 1 non-faulty nodes. Therefore, if the sequence number idc is not the
largest sequence number used node si so far, there must be another authorized
transaction with the same sequence number idc, and it must be committed by
at least f + 1 non-faulty nodes. So, at least f + 1 non-faulty nodes would
have detected the transaction T as functionally invalid and rejected it. As a
result, the transaction T can only be signed by at most 2f nodes, which is not
sufficient for the transaction T to be authorized as per definition 4.2.1. Hence,
if the transaction T is authorized, its sequence number idc must be valid.
• Case 2: The transaction T is a double-spend transaction, i.e. at least of the
inputs used in T has been used as an input by another transaction.
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Let us consider that there exists a transaction T′ initiated by the node si that
used an input which has been re-used by the transaction T. If the sequence
number of T′ is greater than or equal to the sequence number of T, then the
transaction T will not be authorized as per the argument in case 1. Alternatively,
if the sequence number used in T′ is less than the sequence number used in T,
then using lemma 4.2, we can say that the transaction T′ is authorized and is
committed by at least 2f+1 server nodes prior to the functional validation of the
transaction T. This means that the transaction T will be detected as a double-
spend transaction by at least f + 1 non-faulty nodes, and can be signed by at
most 2f nodes, which is not sufficient for the transaction T to be authorized
as per definition 4.2.1. Hence, if a transaction T is authorized, it can not be a
double-spend transaction.
Hence, a functionally invalid transaction can not be authorized as per definition
4.2.1.
Theorem 4.3. A transaction is authorized if and only if it is structurally and func-
tionally valid.
Proof. Combining lemmas 4.1 and 4.3, we can say that if a transaction is authorized,
it must be structurally and functionally valid. Conversely, if a transaction is either
structurally or functionally invalid, and the transaction is authorized, it would lead
to a contradiction of the the hypothesis in lemmas 4.1 or 4.3 respectively.
Corollary 4.3.1. A double-spend transaction can not be authorized.
Proof. We know that a double spend transaction is considered functionally invalid as
per definitions 4.9 and 4.6. Therefore, as per theorem 4.3, it can not be authorized.
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4.5 Efficiency Improvement Ideas
As mentioned earlier, the authorized transactions T are included in the input
transactions I of a proposed transaction and in the new transaction set TN . For effi-
cient implementation, these sets can be defined with pair 〈s, id〉 where s is the sender
node and id is the sequence number of the corresponding transaction T. Correspond-
ing validations can be suitably modified to retrieve the authorized transactions, before
validation, from the authorized transaction set TA using the 〈s, id〉 pair.
Note that the size of a pair 〈s, id〉 is constant, whereas the size of the corresponding
transaction depends on the number of inputs, outputs and the server node signatures.
As a result, the size of the pair 〈s, id〉 is much smaller as compared to the transaction
data structure.
4.5.1 Receiver Protocol
We now discuss the efficiency concerns and potential improvements concerning
the receiver protocol depicted in figure 4.3 and figure 4.4 (lines 25-28).
As discussed in subsection 4.3.2, using the protocol, a node is guaranteed to
receive all the newly authorized transactions wherein it is the receiver. However, it
can receive all the transactions again that received during the last execution of the
protocol along with the transactions that were authorized after the last execution.
We can control this redundancy in successive responses to the receiver protocol
by modifying the protocol as follows.
• The receiver node si constructs a known transactions set TK of 〈s, id〉 pairs
using its new transaction set TN such that all the corresponding transactions
involved si as a receiver.
• The receiver node si sends the set TK as a request parameter in the receiver
37
protocol to all server nodes and collects 2f + 1 responses before termination.
• Each server node processes the request by constructing the response transaction
set TR similar to the construction shown in figure 4.4 (line 26) with a modifica-
tion that it excludes all the transactions that have been included in the request
parameter TK , and sends the response set TR to the node si.
• The receiver process the received transactions in the same way as shown in
figure 4.3.
Now, observe that the receiver’s known transactions set TK may contain a lot
of transactions, but they are specified in the minimal possible way using a 〈s, id〉
pair, and as a result, the size of the set TK will be smaller than set of corresponding
transactions. Using the set TK , each server node reduces the size of its response set
and the number of transactions received and processed by the receiver node during
the protocol will correspond to the newly authorized transactions only.
Future work can introduce new model parameters to further optimize the proto-
col.
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Chapter 5
AUDIT STRUCTURE
PCAOB Auditing Standards [22] define the objective of audit of financial state-
ments as ”the expression of an opinion on the fairness with which they present, in
all material respects, financial position, results of operations, and its cash flows in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.” Audit procedures include
assessment of internal controls over reporting as well as substantive procedures for
gathering evidence.
Before we discuss our audit structure, let us discuss an audit procedure in context
of a financial transaction processing system. We assume that, given a server node si
and set TCi of transaction involving si as input or output, there exists a deterministic
summarizing function summarize : (si,T
C
i ) → σ that produces a summary σ of
the transaction set TAi with respect to the node si, and the function is known to all
nodes in the network. By virtue of this assumption, we defer the definition of the
summarizing function to the financial experts so that it conforms to the requirements
of substantive procedures to be used in the financial audit.
Figure 5.1 illustrates some potential examples of the transaction set summary.
Given the set of transactions shown in figure, where transactions 1-5 are sent by s1
and transactions 6-10 are received by s1, the possible summaries for the node s1 can
be as follows.
• σ1 = Sum(Received by s1)− Sum(Sent by s1)
• σ2 = 〈 Sum(Sent by s1), Sum(Received by s1) 〉
• σ3 = {〈si,Total〉 : Total = Sum(Received by s1 from si) − Sum(Sent by s1 to si)}
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Figure 5.1: Transaction Set Summary Examples
• σ4 = { 〈si, Sent, Received〉 : Received = Sum(Received by s1 from si),
Sent = Sum(Sent by s1 to si)}
Let TC be the complete set of authorized transactions for the entire network, i.e.
a union of all the authorized transactions sets of all server nodes in the network, at
the time of the audit. And let TCi be the set of authorized transactions that involve
the node si as a sender or a receiver at the time of the audit. We define the audit
procedure as follows.
Definition 5.1. (Audit) Given a complete set of authorized transactions TC, a set
of transactions TCi involving node si as a sender or receiver and a summary value σ
at a particular time, an audit of the node si is defined as a procedure of verifying the
following criteria.
1. σ = summarize(si,T
C
i ), i.e. the value σ corresponds to the set T
C
i for the node
si as per the summarizing function summarize,
2. the set TCi is complete, i.e. it contains all the transactions in T
A involving node
si as a sender or receiver, and
3. the set TCi is sound, i.e. it does not contain any transaction not in T
C
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Let us analyze this audit procedure in absence of any audit structure. We discuss
naive approaches for the analysis, but we use the minimal possible lower bounds of
processing time required in order to be representative of an optimal solution. We
consider two scenarios as follows.
1. Bitcoin Blockchain: In Bitcoin, the network maintains a common Blockchain
structure and the Blockchain is expected to contain all the completed transac-
tions at any given time. So, we assume that downloading the Blockchain from
the network will provide the auditor with the correct transactions set TC , which
can be used as a reference for verifying the completeness and soundness of the
set TCi , provided by node si, and it would require at least Ω(|TCi |) time. Now,
the auditor can verify the summary σ, provided by node si, with respect to the
set TCi and it would also require at least Ω(|TCi |) time. Therefore, the audit
procedure on the Bitcoin Blockchain can be expected to take at least Ω(|TCi |)
time. Additionally, an auditor will be required to query the network to down-
load the Blockchain in order to validate the completeness and soundness of the
set TCi provided by the node si.
2. Our Transaction Model: In our model, none of the server nodes are expected to
maintain the complete set of authorized transactions. So, in order to compile
the set TC , the auditor needs to request authorized transaction sets from all the
nodes in the network and construct a union of all the responses. The auditor
is expected to receive at least 2f + 1 responses as f can be faulty, i.e. O(f)
responses each of size O(|TC |) ≈ O(|TCi |). The union operation will take at least
Ω(|TCi |) time. Then, the auditor can perform the verification of the set TCi and
the summary σ, provided by node si, which would again require at least Ω(|TCi |)
time. So, the audit procedure can be expected to take at least Ω(|TCi |) time.
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Again, the auditor will be required to query the network in order to compile the
set TC so as to validate the completeness and soundness of the set TCi provided
by the node si.
Therefore, in either scenario, the audit procedure time complexity depends upon
the number of transactions in the set TCi , which can be significantly large for a bank
and is very inefficient for an audit. Furthermore, the auditor will be required to
query the network to construct the set TC as an accurate representation of the set of
transactions in the system that can be used as a point of reference in validating the
completeness and soundness of the set TCi provided by the node si. We also note that
validating the soundness of the set TCi can be done without constructing the set T
C
in presence of verifiable evidence, e.g. set of server signatures in our model, however,
the validation of the completeness of the set TCi requires set T
C to ensure that the
node si has not withheld any transactions from the auditor.
We propose an audit trail model that (1) provides the auditor with the guarantee
that the set of transactions provided by the corresponding node is sound and complete,
without querying any other node in the network, and (2) allows the audit procedure
to be completed in time independent of the number of transactions. This would
significantly improve the efficiency of the audit procedure, thereby reducing the cost
of an external audit.
5.1 Audit Trail Model
Financial audit is a periodic activity, where the periodicity can be monthly, quar-
terly, yearly or some other established time period. And therefore, the audit of a
particular period needs to distinguish the transactions that occurred during the con-
cerned period from the ones that occurred during other periods. We do not assume a
specific periodicity or the start/end parameters of those periods in our model. We as-
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sume that the participating entities will define time-periods as per their requirements
and utilize our model accordingly.
Each node si constructs a linear audit trail consisting of only the transactions that
involve node si as either the sender or a receiver, and this audit trail can be used as
the node si’s transaction set T
C
i during an audit. The audit trail is sub-divided into
a connected sequence of audit checkpoints, each of which represents a consolidated
record of financial activity, both the transactions and the summary, for the concerned
node during a specified time-period.
To illustrate the idea, we use an example. Let us consider a scenario where the
bank B is subject to annual auditing, i.e. at the end of each year, the bank B is
required to publish an audited summary of its financial activity for the year. So,
for the year-end audit, the bank B is required to provide the auditor with the set
of transactions that occurred during the year involving it as either the sender or a
beneficiary. Let us assume that the bank B decides to perform daily checkpointing,
i.e. it constructs one audit checkpoint every day to represent its financial activity for
the day. Consequently, at the year-end audit, the bank B can provide the auditor
with the corresponding section of its audit trail consisting of 365 (or 366) checkpoints,
such that the first checkpoint represents day 1 of the year and the last checkpoint
represents the last day of the year. Figure 5.2 used to demonstrate an example
audit trail for this scenario, where the time-period k represents day 1 of the year
and time-period k + 364 represents last day of the year. The (*) symbol is used to
denote a reference to the previous checkpoint (pointed to by the respective arrows).
If the auditor can be provided with the guarantee that the audit trail construction
ensures completeness and soundness of the underlying transaction sets, and that each
summary can be guaranteed to be an accurate representation of the corresponding
transaction set, then the auditor is only required to validate the consolidated value
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of the 365 checkpoint summaries, which is independent of the number of transactions
in the underlying transaction sets.
Figure 5.2: Audit Trail Example
In this way, our model allows each participating bank to define its own frequency
of checkpointing and its correlation with the periodicity of its audit requirements.
It is important to note that, in our model, each node constructs its own audit
trail independent of other nodes, unlike the Bitcoin [21] Blockchain where the entire
network shares a common linear chain of transaction blocks. Furthermore, an audit
trail in our model differs from the Bitcoin Blockchain in terms of its correlation to
the processing of underlying transactions. In Bitcoin, a transaction is considered as
completed when it has been included sufficiently deep in the Blockchain, which means
that the frequency of block creation constrains the productivity of the Bitcoin network
in terms of transaction processing. Whereas, in our model, transaction authorization
is performed independently of the audit trail construction.
The key characteristic considerations of the model are as follows.
• When a node si constructs an audit checkpoint, it should include all the trans-
actions that involve si as the sender or receiver of the transaction and were
authorized during the time-period to which the audit checkpoint corresponds.
• For any node, the set of transactions in every audit checkpoint is required to
be mutually exclusive from the transaction sets in all other audit checkpoints.
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• Each audit checkpoint is required to include an accurate summary for its set of
transaction.
• Each node is required to link its audit checkpoints together in a linear audit
trail, such that each audit checkpoint contains a reference to the previous audit
checkpoint.
We enforce the above mentioned constraints by requiring each audit checkpoint to
be validated and signed by at least 2f+1 processing server nodes in the network, and
the resulting signature set is considered as a proof of validity for an audit checkpoint.
An audit checkpoint validated and signed by 2f+1 nodes is referred to as an authorized
checkpoint. Similar to our transaction processing model, each processing server node
validates a checkpoint using its local knowledge only and no server node is required to
maintain all the checkpoint information for any node. Each server node si, that signs
a checkpoint, is required to maintain the checkpoint as a part of its local checkpoint
set and also keep track of the transactions that have been included in a checkpoint
by a node. The node si uses this local knowledge to validate future checkpoints.
We would like to make an important distinction before discussing how a server
node validates the transaction set in a checkpoint. For the purpose of abstraction,
we refer to the constituents of an audit checkpoint as transactions. It should be
construed that an audit checkpoint contains transactions only in a symbolic sense,
i.e. it contains verifiable references to the corresponding authorized transactions.
As discussed in chapter 4, each authorized transaction is added to the new trans-
actions set TN for each server node involved in it as a sender or receiver. Initially,
the status of the transaction is set to be new. Each server node constructs its audit
checkpoints by including all its new transactions from its local copy of the set TN .
Similarly, each server node validates a checkpoint using its local copy of the set TN .
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Once, the checkpoint is authorized, the corresponding entries are removed from the
set TN by the checkpoint initiator as well as all the server nodes that sign it, and
those entries no longer considered new. If a server node detects that a transaction
included in the audit checkpoint being processed is not a new transaction, it rejects
the checkpoint. We show that our protocol guarantees that no authorized transaction
can be included in more than one authorized audit checkpoint by any server node.
We also consider the possibility that, during the construction of an audit check-
point, the server node may not be aware of a newly authorized transaction, or a
transaction being processed at the same time, where it is the receiver. So we allow
the server nodes to exclude such a transaction at most once from its checkpoint pro-
cessing, i.e. it is required to include that transaction in the subsequent checkpoint.
This constraint is enforced by a notification mechanism. If a server node detects that
a new transaction is excluded from the audit checkpoint being processed, the node
notifies the checkpoint initiator about the transaction, and changes the status of the
transaction in the set TN as notified. If a server node detects that a notified transac-
tion is excluded from the audit checkpoint being processed, it rejects the checkpoint.
We show that our protocol guarantees that an authorized transaction is required to
be included in one of the subsequent two audit checkpoints by the receiver node of
the transaction.
As a result, if a sender node si completes phase 2 of transaction authorization
protocol for a transaction T at time t, then
• the node si must include the transaction T only in its first checkpoint con-
structed after time t, and
• each node sj, involved in the transaction T as a receiver, must include the
transaction T in exactly one of its first two checkpoints constructed after time
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t.
At any given time t, the audit trail for any node must contain all its audit check-
points authorized by the time t, such that each audit checkpoint contains a reference
to the previous authorized checkpoint.
For audit checkpoints, we consider a stronger reference mechanism which ensures
that an authorized checkpoint must be rendered immutable once it is referenced in
another checkpoint as its previous authorized checkpoint. Similar to Bitcoin [21]
Blockchain, we use collision-resistant hash values as references for the authorized
checkpoints because it can be assumed, by virtue of the definition of collision-resistant
hash functions (CRHF), that an efficient (i.e. probabilistic polynomial time) server
node will not be able to modify the checkpoint without affecting a detectable change in
the corresponding hash value. Therefore, when we symbolically include the authorized
checkpoint in its succeeding checkpoint, it can be construed that a collision-resistant
hash value of the said checkpoint is used as the reference mechanism.
Using this audit trail construction, we derive an interesting property that if a
checkpoint in an audit trail is verified to be authorized, then each checkpoint, that
can be traced from its sequence of preceding checkpoint references in the audit trail,
must also be authorized. We use this property of our audit trail model to show that
the audit procedure (definition 5.1) can be performed in time independent of the
number of the transactions and the auditor is not required to query any other node in
the network to validate the soundness or completeness of the underlying transaction
set.
The further discussion of the audit trail model in this chapter is organized as
follows.
• In section 5.2, we define the audit checkpoint and audit trail data structures
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used in our model.
• Section 5.3 defines the validation structure to be used by a server node for
validating audit checkpoints.
• Section 5.4 discusses the audit checkpoint processing protocol for a checkpoint
initiator node and a processing node.
• In section 5.5, we analyze the audit trail model in detail.
• Section 5.6 discusses some efficiency improvement ideas pertaining to our audit
trail model.
5.2 Audit Data Structures
In this section, we define and discuss the data structures used by our audit trail
model.
5.2.1 Audit Checkpoints
The life-cycle of an audit checkpoint involves 2 stages:
1. Proposed: When a initiator node sends the checkpoint for authorization to the
network, the checkpoint is said to be a proposed checkpoint. We use α to denote
a proposed checkpoint. The structural composition of a proposed checkpoint is
described in definition 5.2.
2. Authorized: When a server node receives a proposed checkpoint α, it validates
the checkpoint using its local knowledge and responds with a signature if the
proposed checkpoint is valid according to it. Once the initiator node receives
2f +1 signatures from the network, the checkpoint is said to be authorized. We
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use β to denote an authorized checkpoint. Authorized checkpoint data structure
is formally defined in definitions 5.3.1 and 5.3.2.
Definition 5.2. (Proposed Checkpoint) A proposed checkpoint α is defined as a 6-
tuple 〈s, δ,TC , σ, βp, d〉, where
• s is the server node which initiates the checkpoint.
• δ is the integer time-period value for the checkpoint. It is used in a similar
manner to the sequence number id used in the transaction model.
• TC is the set of transactions that involve node s as input or output during the
time-period δ − 1 to δ. The transaction set is validated by server nodes using
their local knowledge of the new transaction set TN .
• σ is the summary for the checkpoint calculated by the summarizing function
summarize. The summary is validated by the server nodes while authorizing
the checkpoint.
• βp is the reference to previous authorized checkpoint for the node s, such that if
δp is the time-period for the checkpoint βp, then δ − δp = 1.
• d is the digital signature of the sender node for the checkpoint (s, δ,TC , σ, βp).
The definition of the time-period δ has been left abstract in order to account for
individual financial reporting and auditing requirements. An example of time-period
can be a day, where s creates an audit checkpoint each day. Similarly, a node can
define its time-period δ to be less than or more than the length of the day depending
upon their requirements.
For simplicity of the discussion, we have defined the set TC as a set of transactions.
However, it can replaced by a set of 〈s′, id〉 pairs, where s′ is the sender node and id
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is the sequence number of the concerned transactions. Also, as discussed in section
5.1, the reference βp to the previous authorized checkpoint should be understood as
a collision-resistant hash value of the checkpoint.
Definition 5.3. (Authorized Checkpoint) An authorized checkpoint β, depicted by the
figure 5.3, is defined as a pair 〈α, D〉, where α = 〈s, δ,TC , σ, βp, d〉 is the underlying
proposed checkpoint and D represents the set of 2f+1 server node signatures collected
during the authorization of the checkpoint α.
Figure 5.3: Audit Checkpoint Model
Definition 5.3.1. (Authorized Checkpoint) A checkpoint β : 〈α, D〉 is said to be
authorized if D contains 2f + 1 valid signatures from distinct server nodes.
authorized(〈α,D〉) , (∀(sj, dj) ∈ D, Verifypkj(α, dj) = true) ∧ |D| = 2f + 1
5.2.2 Audit Trail
For the discussion of an audit trail, we denote an authorized checkpoint as a
composite notation β[si, δ], where si is the initiator node and δ is the time-period
value used in the checkpoint.
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Using the definitions for authorized audit checkpoints, we define an audit trail in
terms of the structural requirements as follows.
Definition 5.4. (Audit Trail) Given an audit period length l defined in terms of
number of audit checkpoint time-periods and a starting time-period δ, an audit trail
for the node si is defined as an audit checkpoint sequence β
T
si, δ, l
composed of the
checkpoints 〈 β[si, δ], β[si, δ + 1], ... β[si, δ + l − 1] 〉 where
• ∀β[si, k] ∈ βTsi, δ, l, β[si, k] contains a reference βp to the previous authorized
checkpoint β[si, k − 1].
We define an authorized audit trail as composed of a sequence of authorized audit
checkpoints as follows.
Definition 5.5. (Authorized Audit Trail) An audit trail βTsi, δ, l = 〈 β[si, δ], β[si, δ+
1], ... β[si, δ + l − 1] 〉 for the node si, where ∀β[si, k] ∈ βTsi, δ, l, β[si, k] contains a
reference βp to the previous authorized checkpoint β[si, k− 1], is said to be authorized
if
• ∀β ∈ βTsi, δ, l, authorized(β), i.e. all the audit checkpoints in the audit trail are
authorized as per definition 5.3.2.
5.2.3 Authorized Checkpoints Set
Using the audit data structures discussed above, each server si maintains the
following data structure for maintaining the local image of the distributed checkpoint
history.
• Authorized Checkpoints (βA) is the set of checkpoints β authorized by the
server node si.
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5.3 Audit Structure Validations
In order to ensure that a server’s checkpoints are processed in order, we require
that the server provide consecutive time-period values for its checkpoints. This re-
quirement is enforced by having the server include the last authorized checkpoint
initiated by the server in the request parameters.
When a sender node si sends a proposed checkpoint α : 〈s, δ,TC , σ, βp, d〉 to the
server nodes for authorization, the last authorized checkpoint for the sender node si,
for which βp is the reference, is accompanied by the checkpoint α as an evidence. We
slightly abuse the notation for simplicity and use βp to denote the previous authorized
checkpoint during the discussion of the validations, however, it should be understood
that βp included in the data structure α is only a reference.
To ensure that the completeness and soundness of the transaction set included
in checkpoints, we make use of the new transaction set TN constructed during the
transaction commit procedure. As noted in chapter 4, initially, each transaction is
committed with a status new for each node involved in the transaction as the sender or
a receiver. When a node constructs its checkpoints, it includes all its new transactions
using its local copy of the new transaction set TN , and each server nodes validates
this criteria using its local copy of the new transaction set TN . We note that during
checkpoint construction, a server node is expected to be aware of all the transactions
where it was the sender, however, it can be unaware of some recently authorized
transactions, or the ones being processed, wherein it is a receiver. Therefore, if
a server node si detects that new transaction, sent by the checkpoint initiator, has
been excluded from the checkpoint being processed, the node si rejects the checkpoint
as invalid; whereas, if the node si detects that a new transaction, expected to be
received by the checkpoint initiator, has been excluded from the checkpoint being
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processed, the node si notifies the checkpoint initiator about the transaction, changes
the status of the transaction as notified and signs the checkpoint under a conditional
expectation that if the checkpoint initiator excludes this notified transaction from the
next checkpoint, the node node si will reject it as invalid.
The audit checkpoint α is considered valid by a non-faulty server node si if all the
following conditions hold.
1. The checkpoint α is structurally well-formed, i.e.
(a) The summary value σ is valid for the transaction set TC in the checkpoint
with respect to the initiator node s
(b) All the transactions, in set TC , are authorized transactions where node s
is either the sender or receiver
(c) The checkpoint βp is an authorized checkpoint initiated by the node s with
the time-period value one less than the time-period value δ in checkpoint
α
(d) The signature d is the valid signature for the sender node s over the check-
point 〈s, δ,TC , σ, βp〉
2. The checkpoint α is functionally valid, i.e.
(a) All the transactions in set TC are new or notified transactions for node s
as per the new transaction set TN of the processing node si
(b) All the notified transactions, as per the new transaction set TN of the
processing node si, for the node s are included in the set T
C
(c) All the new transactions, where the node s is the transaction sender node,
as per the new transaction set TN of the processing node si, are included
in the set TC
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(d) The time-period value δc used in α is greater than all the time-period
values used by the node s in previous checkpoints as per the authorized
checkpoint set βA of the processing node si
Similar to the transaction model validations, the structural validations depend
upon the proposed checkpoint α and the accompanying previous authorized check-
point βp, while the functional validations depend upon the new transactions set T
N
and the authorized checkpoints set βA. Therefore, if a checkpoint is structurally
valid according to one non-faulty node, it will be structurally valid according to all
non-faulty nodes. However, the functional validity of a checkpoint may vary among
non-faulty nodes depending upon the transactions in their new transaction set TN
and the checkpoints in their authorized checkpoints set βA.
Also, the previous checkpoint βp is unique with respect to each proposed check-
point α because according to validation 1(c), it is required to be an authorized check-
point with exactly the previous time-period value, and according to validation 2(d),
the time-period value in α is required to be new, which will not be valid if βp is used
multiple times.
We now formally define the individual validations as building blocks for the struc-
tural and functional validations as mentioned above.
Definition 5.6. (Summary Validation) A proposed checkpoint α : 〈s, δ,TC , σ, βp, d〉
is said to have a valid summary σ if the summarize function produces σ for the
comprising set of transactions TC corresponding to the node s.
validSummary(s,TC , σ) , (σ = summarize(s,TC))
Definition 5.7. (Previous Checkpoint Validation) A checkpoint βp, included in the
proposed checkpoint α, is said to be the valid previous checkpoint for α if βp is an
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authorized checkpoint initiated by the same node and the time-period value in α is
one more than the time-period value in βp.
validPrevCP(α, βp) , authorized(βp) ∧ (α.s = βp.s) ∧ (α.δ = βp.δ + 1)
Definition 5.8. (Authorized Transactions Validation) A proposed checkpoint α, ini-
tiated by node s is structurally valid in terms of the included transactions TC if all
the transactions are authorized transactions and involve s as input or output.
authorizedTxns(s,TC) , ∀T ∈ TC , authorized(T) ∧ (s ∈ T.O ∪ T.I)
Definition 5.9. (Transaction Set Validation) The transaction set TC included in a
checkpoint α proposed by node si is valid if
• all the transactions in TC are new or notified transactions for node si,
• all the notified transactions for node si are included in TC and
• all the new transactions initiated by node si are included in TC
validTxnSet(si,T
C) , ( ∀T ∈ TC , 〈T, si〉 ∈ TN )
∧ ( ∀〈T, si, notified〉 ∈ TN , T ∈ TC )
∧ ( ∀〈T, si〉 ∈ TN , T.s = si =⇒ T ∈ TC )
Definition 5.10. (Time-period Validation) A time-period δc in a proposed checkpoint
α, initiated by the node s, is said to be valid if it is greater than the maximum time-
period used by the node s in previously authorized checkpoints.
validPeriod(s, δc) , δc > max{δ : δ ∈ βA[s]}
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5.3.1 Structural Validations
When a server node si receives a checkpoint for authorization from the sender node
s, the node si first validates the structural integrity of the checkpoint, i.e. ascertains
whether it is well-formed. If the checkpoint is structurally invalid, the node si rejects
the checkpoint. The corresponding validation is defined as follows.
Definition 5.11. (Well-formed Checkpoint) A checkpoint α proposed by a node s is
said to be well-formed if all the transactions in the transaction set TC are authorized,
and the summary, the previous checkpoint and the sender node signature are valid.
wellFormed(α) , validPrevCP(α, α.βp) ∧ authorizedTxns(α.s, α.TC)
∧ validSummary(α.s, α.TC , α.σ) ∧ (Verifypkj(α, α.d) = true)
5.3.2 Functional Validations
After validating the structural integrity of the checkpoint using definition 5.11, the
server node si performs functional validations to verify that the transaction set T
C
is valid using definition 5.9. In doing the validation, the server node si uses its local
knowledge of the new transaction set TN . So it is possible that a non-faulty server
node will consider an invalid transaction set as valid because it may not be aware of a
notified transaction or an excluded transaction that was initiated by node checkpoint
sender node. Nevertheless, if a checkpoint is invalid, it will not be considered valid
by enough servers required for authorizing it.
Similarly, the server node si also verifies, using its local knowledge, that the time-
period value has not been used previously using definition 5.10.
Definition 5.12. (Functionally Valid Checkpoint) A checkpoint α proposed by a node
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s is said to be functionally valid if the transaction set and the time-period are valid.
validCP(α) , validTxnSet(α.s, α.TC) ∧ validPeriod(α.s, α.δ)
5.4 Audit Checkpoint Protocol
As mentioned earlier, the set TC in a proposed checkpoint α can be considered
as a set of transaction identifying pairs 〈s′, id〉 for implementation purposes, where
s′ is the sender node and id is the sequence number of the concerned transactions.
However, in context of the protocol discussed in this section, we assume that the
corresponding set of authorized transactions is sent by the initiator node to all server
nodes for validation, irrespective of the representation of the set TC , of the proposed
checkpoint α. We revisit this point in our efficiency improvement section 5.6 and
discuss ideas to improve the message complexity of the protocol.
We now present the audit checkpoint authorization protocol used by the server
nodes to propose and authorize checkpoints.
5.4.1 Sender Protocol
Each server node si periodically constructs an audit checkpoint and processes
its authorization using the process-checkpoint procedure depicted in figure 5.4.
Unlike the transaction authorization protocol, the audit checkpoint authorization
protocol only uses one phase of communication with the network.
The sender node si maintains a current time-period counter value δc to assign the
δ value to its checkpoints. It begins by constructing the checkpoint which involves
the following steps.
1. The time-period δc is incremented for the current checkpoint (line 6)
2. The transaction set TC is constructed using the new transactions for the node
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Figure 5.4: Audit Checkpoint Sender Protocol
si as per the new transactions set T
N (line 7)
3. The summary value σ is calculated using the summarize function for the trans-
action set TC (line 8)
4. The previous authorized checkpoint βp is retrieved from the authorized check-
points set βA using the time-period δc − 1 (line 9)
5. The checkpoint α is constructed as a 6-tuple (line 11) using the digital signature
di (line 10).
Once the checkpoint is constructed, si sends the checkpoint authorization request
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to all server nodes (line 13) and waits for 2f + 1 valid signatures (lines 14-22). When
a server node sj responds (line 16), the signature dj is accompanied by a set of
transactions TE, which consists of transactions that are new transactions involving si
and are excluded from the checkpoint transaction set TC . A non-faulty server node
sj expects the transactions in T
E to be included by si in its next checkpoint. So,
the node si collects the transactions notified by server nodes in the set T
M (line 19)
and commits the transactions in TM if they have not already been committed and
are authorized transactions (lines 25-27). When 2f + 1 signatures are received, si
commits the checkpoint (line 24) using the commit-cp procedure depicted in figure
5.6.
5.4.2 Server Node Protocol
The corresponding protocol used by server nodes is depicted in figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5: Server Node Protocol for Audit Checkpoint Processing
When the node sj receives the checkpoint authorization request for audit check-
point α from the node si (line 2), sj processes it only if the checkpoint is well-formed
as per the definition 5.11 (line 3). If any of the transactions in the checkpoint are not
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committed, sj commits those transactions for further processing (lines 5-7). Now,
if the checkpoint is functionally valid (line 9), sj digitally signs the checkpoint (line
10) and constructs the set of excluded transaction TE consisting of new transactions
involving si that have not been included in the checkpoint (line 11). Node sj commits
the checkpoint along with the excluded transactions (line 12) and sends the signed
checkpoint to the sender (line 13).
The audit checkpoint commit procedure commit-cp is depicted in figure 5.6. A
checkpoint commit involves three tasks. Firstly, the checkpoint 〈α,D〉 is stored as
an authorized checkpoint βA (line 5). Secondly, the new transactions included in the
checkpoint α.TC are removed from the new transactions set TN (lines 7-9) because
they are not considered new transactions after the checkpoint commit. And finally,
the excluded set of transactions TE are updated as notified in the new transactions
set TN (lines 11-13) to make sure that they are not excluded by the sender node again
in the next checkpoint.
Figure 5.6: Audit Checkpoint Commit Procedure
Server nodes commit missing transactions (fig 5.5, lines 5-7) for two reasons.
Firstly, it helps them improve their local knowledge of the authorized transactions
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in the network. Secondly, if a faulty sender node terminates sender protocol while
processing a transaction at the end of phase 1, the transaction will not be committed
by any server node in the network. As a result, it will not be available as a new
transaction for any server node and consequently, the receiver will not receive the
transaction during the receiver protocol. However, we know that the sender node will
be required to send this authorized transaction while processing the checkpoint, and
each server node can commit the transaction at this time and guarantee progress for
the transaction receiver node.
5.5 Analysis
During our analysis of the audit structure, we denote an authorized checkpoint
as β[si, δ], where si is the initiator node and δ is the time-period value used in the
checkpoint. This provides a composite notation to refer to an authorized checkpoint
with its identifying characteristics.
5.5.1 Checkpoint Processing Protocol
For our analysis of the audit checkpoint processing protocol, we consider the
following properties:
• Theorem 5.1: If non-faulty node initiates a checkpoint, the sender protocol is
guaranteed to terminate.
• Theorem 5.2: All checkpoints initiated by non-faulty sender nodes will be au-
thorized.
• Theorem 5.3: If a transaction T is authorized after the checkpoint β[si, δ] is
authorized and before the checkpoint β[si, δ + 1] is proposed, and the node si
is either the sender or a receiver of the transaction, then si must include T in
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exactly one of the committed checkpoints β[si, δ + 1] or β[si, δ + 2].
• Theorem 5.4: If a transaction T is not authorized, then it can not be included
in any authorized checkpoint.
Theorem 5.1. If non-faulty node initiates a checkpoint, the sender protocol is guar-
anteed to terminate.
Proof. We observe that the sender node has complete knowledge of all the transactions
initiated by it in the past, which prevents it from accidentally excluding an authorized
transaction where it was the sender node. It also has the knowledge of the transactions
that it has included in the past checkpoints, which prevents it from accidentally
including a transaction more than once. Also, if any transactions, where it was
the receiver node, were excluded in the previous checkpoint due to lack of local
knowledge, it would have received the notification from the server nodes and it would
have committed the notified transactions according to each of the server nodes (fig
5.4, lines 19, 25-27). This ensures that those transactions are not excluded during
the current checkpoint construction, so a non-faulty sender not can exclude notified
transactions. It keeps track of its time-period values, which can not be invalid for
any checkpoint. It also has the previous authorized checkpoint which is required to
be included in the current checkpoint. And finally, the summary value is calculated
as per the summarizing function summarize and it will be valid.
So, if the sender node is non-faulty, then its checkpoint must be valid because
a non-faulty sender node constructs the checkpoint as per these specifications (fig
5.4, lines 6-11). Therefore, we can say that the checkpoint must be structurally and
functionally valid as per definitions 5.11 and 5.12 respectively. So, as per algorithm
6 (fig 5.5), each non-faulty server node will sign the checkpoint. We know that there
are at most f faulty nodes, i.e. there are at least 2f + 1 non-faulty nodes in the
62
network, so the sender is guaranteed to receive at least 2f + 1 signatures, which may
or may not contain signatures from faulty nodes. Therefore, the sender will be able
to complete the protocol and terminate.
Theorem 5.2. All checkpoints initiated by non-faulty sender nodes will be authorized.
Proof. Using the argument from Theorem 5.1, we can say that if a non-faulty sender
node initiates a checkpoint, the sender is guaranteed to complete the protocol and
terminate. This follows that the checkpoint will be will be signed by at least 2f + 1
nodes and consequently, will be authorized as per definition 5.3.1.
For the proof of Theorem 5.3, we consider the following lemmas:
• Lemma 5.1: If a transaction T is authorized and the node si is either the sender
or a receiver of the transaction, then si can include T in at most one authorized
checkpoint.
• Lemma 5.2: If a transaction T is authorized after the checkpoint β[si, δ] is
authorized and before the checkpoint β[si, δ + 1] is proposed, and the node si
is either the sender or a receiver of the transaction, then si must include T in
at least one of the authorized checkpoints β[si, δ + 1] or β[si, δ + 2].
Lemma 5.1. If a transaction T is authorized and the node si is either the sender or a
receiver of the transaction, then si can include T in at most one authorized checkpoint.
Proof. As per commit-cp procedure defined in algorithm 7 (fig 5.6), once the check-
point β is committed by a node sj, all the transactions in the transaction set β.T
C
are removed from the new transaction set TN for the node si. If a checkpoint β is
authorized, it is signed and committed by at least 2f + 1 nodes (fig 5.5, lines 10-12),
out of which at least f + 1 nodes must be non-faulty. So, if si includes a transaction
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T ∈ β.TC in another checkpoint β′, at least f + 1 nodes will be able to detect it as
invalid as per definition 5.12 and will not sign the checkpoint β′, and as a result, the
checkpoint β′ will not be authorized.
Lemma 5.2. If a transaction T is authorized after the checkpoint β[si, δ] is authorized
and before the checkpoint β[si, δ+1] is proposed, and the node si is either the sender or
a receiver of the transaction, then si must include T in at least one of the authorized
checkpoints β[si, δ + 1] or β[si, δ + 2].
Proof. As per algorithm 7 (fig 5.5), if the transaction T is a new transaction according
to node sj and the new checkpoint β[si, δ+ 1] does not include T, the node sj notifies
the node si and changes the status of the transaction T for the node si as notified.
Because the transaction T is authorized after the checkpoint β[si, δ] is authorized and
before the checkpoint β[si, δ + 1] is proposed, the transaction T is a new transaction
for the checkpoint β[si, δ + 1] according to at least f + 1 non-faulty nodes, and they
will all change its status to notified upon its exclusion from β[si, δ + 1]. If the next
checkpoint β[si, δ + 2] does not include T, then at least f + 1 nodes will not sign
the checkpoint, and consequently, it will not be authorized. Therefore, the node si
must include the transaction T in at least one of its next 2 checkpoints β[si, δ + 1] or
β[si, δ + 2].
Theorem 5.3. If a transaction T is authorized after the checkpoint β[si, δ] is autho-
rized and before the checkpoint β[si, δ + 1] is proposed, and the node si is either the
sender or a receiver of the transaction, then si must include T in exactly one of the
committed checkpoints β[si, δ + 1] or β[si, δ + 2].
Proof. The result follows from combining Lemma 5.1 and 5.2.
Theorem 5.4. If a transaction T is not authorized, then si can not include T in any
authorized checkpoint.
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Proof. If the checkpoint β[si, δ] is authorized, then it must be valid according to at
least 2f + 1 nodes, i.e. at least f + 1 non-faulty nodes. As per definition 5.8 and
5.11, a checkpoint is structurally invalid if a transaction in its transaction set TC is
not authorized, which is validated by the non-faulty server nodes in algorithm 6 (fig
5.5, line 3). Therefore, if β[si, δ] is authorized, then it can not contain a transaction
T which is not authorized.
5.5.2 Audit Trail
For our analysis of the audit trail model, we consider the following properties:
• Theorem 5.5: An audit trail is authorized if an only if the last checkpoint, in
the audit trail, is an authorized checkpoint.
• Theorem 5.6 If the audit trail is authorized, then it must satisfy all the prop-
erties required in the audit procedure as per definition 5.1.
For the proof of Theorem 5.5, we consider the following lemmas.
• Lemma 5.3: If a checkpoint β[si, δ], proposed by node si, is authorized and it
contains βp as a reference to the previous checkpoint β[si, δ− 1], it implies that
the checkpoint β[si, δ − 1] is authorized.
• Lemma 5.4: If a checkpoint β[si, δ− 1], proposed by node si, is not authorized,
it implies the checkpoint β[si, δ] can not be authorized given β[si, δ] contains βp
as a reference to the previous checkpoint β[si, δ − 1].
• Lemma 5.5: Given an audit trail βTsi, δ, l for the node si, if a checkpoint β[si, k] ∈
βTsi,δ,l is an authorized checkpoint, it implies that the audit trail β
T
si,δ,k+1−δ ⊆s
βTsi,δ,l is authorized. (⊆s is used as a symbol for sub-sequence)
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Lemma 5.3. If a checkpoint β[si, δ], proposed by node si, is authorized and it contains
βp as a reference to the previous checkpoint β[si, δ− 1], it implies that the checkpoint
β[si, δ − 1] is authorized.
Proof. If the checkpoint β[si, δ] is authorized, then it must be valid according to at
least 2f + 1 nodes, out of which at least f + 1 nodes must be non-faulty. As per
definition 5.7 and 5.11, a checkpoint is structurally invalid if the previous checkpoint,
for which βp is the reference, is not authorized; and it is verified by all the non-faulty
server nodes in algorithm 6 (fig 5.5, line 3). Therefore, if β[si, δ] is authorized and it
contains βp as a reference to the previous checkpoint β[si, δ− 1], then the checkpoint
β[si, δ − 1] must be authorized.
Lemma 5.4. If a checkpoint β[si, δ − 1], proposed by node si, is not authorized, it
implies the checkpoint β[si, δ] can not be authorized given β[si, δ] contains βp as a
reference to the previous checkpoint β[si, δ − 1].
Proof. If follows the same argument as the proof of Lemma 5.3.
Lemma 5.5. Given an audit trail βTsi, δ, l = 〈 β[si, δ], β[si, δ+1], ... β[si, δ+l−1] 〉 for
the node si, where ∀β[si, k] ∈ βTsi, δ, l, β[si, k] contains a reference βp to the previous
authorized checkpoint β[si, k − 1], if a checkpoint β[si, k] ∈ βTsi,δ,l is an authorized
checkpoint, it implies that the audit trail βTsi,δ,k+1−δ ⊆s βTsi,δ,l is authorized. (⊆s is
used as a symbol for sub-sequence)
Proof. We begin by observing that if the checkpoint β[si, k] ∈ βTsi,δ,l is authorized, then
as per definition 5.5, the audit trail βTsi,k,1 (containing only one checkpoint β[si, k]) is
authorized. We restructure the argument as follows: if the audit βTsi,k,1 ⊆s βTsi,δ,l is
authorized, it implies that the audit trail βTsi,δ,k+1−δ ⊆s βTsi,δ,l is authorized. We prove
this result using induction.
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Consider 2 base cases. The base case with x = k, i.e. βTsi,k,k+1−k, refers to the audit
trail βTsi,k,1 which is clearly authorized given β
T
si,k,1
is authorized. For the base case
x = k − 1, we show that if βTsi,k,1 is authorized, it implies that βTsi,x,k+1−x ⊆s βTsi,δ,l is
authorized. We know that β[si, k] is an authorized checkpoint and it contains βp as a
reference to the previous checkpoint β[si, k−1], so using Lemma 5.4, we can say that
β[si, k − 1] is an authorized checkpoint, which means that βTsi,x,k+1−x is authorized.
Let us consider k − 1 ≥ x > δ such that the audit trail βTsi,x,k+1−x ⊆s βTsi,δ,l is
authorized given that βTsi,k,1 is authorized. Our inductive hypothesis is that if the
audit trail βTsi,x,k+1−x ⊆s βTsi,δ,l is authorized given that βTsi,k,1 is authorized, then it
implies that the audit trail βTsi,x−1,k+1−(x−1) ⊆s βTsi,δ,l is authorized. We know that the
checkpoint β[si, x] ∈ βTsi,x,k+1−x is authorized as per definition 5.5 and β[si, x] contains
βp as a reference to the previous checkpoint β[si, x−1]. So, as per lemma 5.3, we can
say that β[si, x−1] is an authorized checkpoint, which means that βTsi,x−1,k+1−(x−1) ⊆s
βTsi,δ,l is authorized. Applying this inductive argument for x = δ − 1, we get the
required result.
Theorem 5.5. An audit trail βTsi, δ, l = 〈 β[si, δ], β[si, δ + 1], ... β[si, δ + l − 1] 〉
for the node si, where ∀β[si, k] ∈ βTsi, δ, l, β[si, k] contains βp as a reference to the
previous authorized checkpoint β[si, k − 1], is authorized if an only if the checkpoint
β[si, δ + l − 1] is an authorized checkpoint.
Proof. Clearly, as per definition 5.5, if the audit trail βTsi,δ,l is authorized, it implies
that the checkpoint β[si, δ + l − 1] must be an authorized checkpoint. Conversely,
using lemma 5.5, we can say that if the checkpoint β[si, δ + l − 1] is an authorized
checkpoint, it implies that the audit trail βTsi,δ,l is authorized.
Theorem 5.6. If the audit trail βTsi, δ, l = 〈 β[si, δ], β[si, δ+1], ... β[si, δ+l−1] 〉 for
the node si, where ∀β[si, k] ∈ βTsi, δ, l, β[si, k] contains βp as a reference to the previous
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authorized checkpoint β[si, k − 1], is authorized, then the following 3 properties hold.
1. ∀β ∈ βTsi,δ,l, β.σ = summarize(si, β.TC)
2. The set of transactions TAi =
⋃
β∈βTsi,δ,l
β.TC is sound, i.e.
(a) it contains only authorized transactions
(b) ∀β, β′ ∈ βTsi,δ,l, β.TC∩β′.TC = ∅, i.e. no transaction is included in multiple
checkpoints.
3. The set of transactions TAi =
⋃
β∈βTsi,δ,l
β.TC is complete, i.e.
(a) it includes all transactions for node si that were authorized after the check-
point β[si, δ − 2] was authorized and were excluded from the checkpoint
β[si, δ − 1]
(b) it includes all transactions for node si authorized between the checkpoints
β[si, δ − 1] and β[si, δ + l − 3]
Proof. As per definition 5.5, we can say that ∀β ∈ βTsi,δ,l, β is an authorized checkpoint.
As per definition 5.6 and 5.11, a checkpoint is structurally invalid if the summary σ is
not valid according to the summarize function, which is validated by the non-faulty
server nodes in algorithm 6 (fig 5.5, line 3). So, if a checkpoint is authorized, it must
be structurally valid and hence, property 1 must hold. Properties 2 and 3 follow from
Theorems 5.3 and 5.4 for authorized checkpoints.
5.5.3 Audit Process
Using theorem 5.6, we can redefine the audit process (definition 5.1) using our au-
dit trail model and show that the audit process can be completed in time independent
of the number of transactions in the audit trail using theorem 5.7.
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Definition 5.13. (Audit) Given an audit trail βTsi,δ,l = 〈 β[si, δ], β[si, δ + 1], ...
β[si, δ + l − 1] 〉 and a summary σi for the node si, an audit can be defined as a
procedure to verify the following criteria
1. the audit trail βTsi,δ,l is authorized, and
2. σi =
∑
β∈βTsi,δ,l
β.σ, i.e. the summary σi is the aggregate of all the checkpoint
summaries in the audit trail.
Theorem 5.7. Given an audit trail βTsi, δ, l = 〈 β[si, δ], β[si, δ+1], ... β[si, δ+l−1] 〉
and a summary σi for a node si, the audit procedure can be performed in O(l + f)
deterministic time.
Proof. Using Theorem 5.5, we know that the audit trail βTsi,δ,l is authorized if (1)
β[si, δ+ l−1] is an authorized checkpoint, and (2) ∀β[si, k] ∈ βTsi, δ, l, β[si, k] contains
βp as a reference to the previous authorized checkpoint β[si, k − 1].
The sequence of checkpoint references can be verified in O(l) time. Let us consider
the check regarding whether β[si, δ + l − 1] is an authorized checkpoint or not. As
per definition 5.3.1, the checkpoint is authorized if it contains 2f + 1 valid signatures
from distinct server nodes. Deterministic check for the validity of the set of signatures
can be performed in O(f) time. Considering the size of summary values as a model
constant, the value σi can be verified in O(l) time. Hence, the audit procedure can
be performed in O(l + f) deterministic time.
Note that the time complexity of above audit procedure does not depend upon
the number of transactions |TCi |, which is at least Ω(|TCi |) factor improvement in the
audit procedure using our audit trail model.
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5.6 Efficiency Improvement Ideas
As mentioned earlier, the set TC , in a checkpoint β, is defined as a set of autho-
rized transactions. For efficient implementation, these sets can be defined with pair
〈s, id〉 where s is the sender node and id is the sequence number of the corresponding
transaction T. Corresponding validations can be suitably modified to retrieve the au-
thorized transactions, before validation, from the authorized transaction set TA using
the 〈s, id〉 pair. As a result, the size of the set TC can reduced significantly because
each pair 〈s, id〉 has a constant size, whereas the size of corresponding transaction
depends upon the number of inputs, outputs and server signatures.
5.6.1 Audit Checkpoint Protocol
We now discuss the efficiency concerns and potential improvements concerning
the audit checkpoint protocol depicted in figure 5.4 and figure 5.5.
As discussed in section 5.4, our protocol depends upon the assumption that the
set of authorized transactions is sent by the initiator node to all server nodes for
validation, irrespective of the representation of the set TC , of the proposed checkpoint
α. This means that the message complexity of the audit checkpoint protocol is very
high and depends upon the number of transactions in the checkpoint, which is clearly
very inefficient.
We now discuss some revisions to the protocol that can provide significant effi-
ciency improvements in an implementations, by only requiring an additional round
of communication between the checkpoint initiator node and the server nodes.
• The checkpoint initiator node si constructs the set TC of 〈s, id〉 pairs using its
new transaction set TN such that all the corresponding transactions involved si
as either the sender or a receiver, and sends the set TC as the constituent of the
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checkpoint instead of the set of corresponding authorized transactions.
• Each server node sj constructs a deficiency set TD ⊆ TC consisting of 〈s, id〉
pairs from the set TC which represents a transaction not available, for verifi-
cation, in node sj’s local copy of the authorized transaction set T
A. Node sj
sends this set TD to the initiator node si as a request for missing transactions.
• When initiator node si receives a request for missing transactions in the form of
set TD, it can reply with the requested transactions and the rest of the protocol
proceeds in the same way as defined in figures 5.4 and 5.5.
If the checkpoint initiator is non-faulty, then all the transactions in its checkpoint
must be authorized transactions and each of them must have been signed by 2f + 1
nodes, out of which at most f can be faulty. Therefore, each node can be expected to
maintain a significant subset of the transactions included in the checkpoint, and each
deficiency set TD can be expected to be much smaller than the set TC . As a result,
the number of transactions communicated during this protocol will be significantly
lesser than the original protocol.
Another improvement in the size of the set TC can be made by simply including
the last sequence number of the transactions where the checkpoint initiator was the
sender node, instead of the entire list. The previous checkpoint included in the
checkpoint can be used to find the lower bound of the list of sequence numbers to be
used for the actual transactions set in the checkpoint.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Summary
While the existing cryptocurrency proposals focus on solving distributed con-
sensus problem in order to provide cryptographic security of the system, we have
presented a novel alternative non-consensus based approach which utilizes majority
signature based replicated storage protocol to process transactions securely, as shown
by our analysis. Furthermore, we have presented a self-verifiable audit trail model
which facilitates efficient financial auditing for individual financial entities, a desirable
property that has not been addressed by the existing cryptocurrency models. Our
analysis shows that an audit trail can be verified in time independent of the number
of transactions.
Additionally, our model presents an effective solution for the decentralized inter-
bank payment processing problem, which can serve as a practical alternative to the
existing centralized payment processing and settlement solutions. A system based
on our model can potentially enable inter-bank transactions to be completed with
lower cost to the customer due to the absence of a central processing entity levying a
transaction processing fee.
6.2 Future Work
Our work has introduced a new way of approaching the decentralized financial
transaction processing model, and there are a variety of exciting opportunities for
future work, summarized as follows.
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• Our model assumes a trust relationship between the customers and the server
nodes federated by their corresponding banks. Further analysis could be built
upon a generalized model wherein customers interact with the network of nodes
without any implicit trust assumptions.
• We assume the number of server nodes to be n = 3f + 1. Future work can
aim to derive an equivalence with the model that allows n ≥ 3f + 1 using a
Byzantine quorum system based approach. Byzantine quorum systems have
been studied extensively in the literature [17, 18, 7, 19, 2, 3] and future work
can build a quorum system for extending this model.
• Our protocol and analysis assume a static network configuration, where the
number of banks and server nodes is n. Additional work is required to analyze
the schematics and impact of dynamic reconfigurations in the network. This
work can follow a similar approach as discussed by Aguilera et. al [1].
• Smart contracts execution is an exciting avenue that can be studied as an ex-
tension of our model to support additional financial applications.
• Finally, a practical study can be performed using a prototypical implementation
of the model to analyze its practical effectiveness and comparability to existing
protocols.
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